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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA

Dr. Susan Kaufman Purcell

Introduction. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 mark a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. Prior to that date, Washington's approach to the world had been relatively unfocused. The Cold War had ended more than a decade earlier. The Soviet Union, the enemy that had given focus to U.S. foreign policy no longer existed. As the victor in the Cold War, the United States became the sole superpower in the new global order. The new Pax Americana, despite its name, was not free of conflict. Nevertheless, threats to the global order and to U.S. security were more dispersed and diffuse than they were during the Cold War. As a result, they initially appeared to be more manageable and less serious than those that had characterized the Cold War years. Policymakers and others were aware of the potential threats that the diffusion of high technology might pose to the new world order, but the problems did not seem imminent.

September 11 drastically changed Washington's vision of the world and the assumptions upon which its foreign policy had been based during the 1990s. The attacks on the World Trade Center enshrined terrorism as the number one security threat, and the war against terrorism became the overwhelming priority of U.S. foreign policy. The focus on combating terrorism, however, soon led to a profound rethinking of the basic doctrines that had underpinned U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Such rethinking, which is an ongoing process, will have important implications for the structure of the U.S. armed forces, the development of weapons and related technologies, and the way in which U.S. assets are deployed.

The recent rethinking and reorientation of U.S. policy had immediate consequences for Washington's policy toward Latin America. This was despite the fact that Afghanistan in particular and the Middle East in general were the foci of the United States' initial responses to the attacks. In one important way, Washington's post-September 11 approach to Latin America was reminiscent of the Cold War days. Once again the United States was looking at Latin America through a security lens, while Latin America wanted the emphasis to remain on economic development. U.S. policy toward Latin America in the coming decade, however, will not be a repeat of

its Cold War policies. Both the United States and Latin America have changed significantly since that period. As a result, Washington will not "neglect" Latin America, as many Latins fear is already happening in the aftermath of September 11. Instead, Washington will remain, and will need to remain, engaged with the region in a variety of ways that could ultimately benefit the entire Western Hemisphere.

The foreign policy of candidate Bush. The foreign policy ideas that George W. Bush put forward during his presidential campaign were quite different from, and sometimes diametrically opposed to, President Bush's more recent pronouncements on foreign policy. As a candidate, President Bush's positions were often defensive. He supported the development of an anti-missile defense system, despite the fact that it was a very costly option and it remained far from clear whether such a system would work. He spoke of possible U.S. opposition to, and withdrawal from, a number of multilateral treaties. He criticized the Clinton administration for trying to be the "world's policeman." And he asserted that U.S. armed forces should not be used for nation building. In general, he signaled that if elected, his approach to foreign policy would be less ambitious, and his goals, less grandiose, than those of his predecessor.

In many ways, the younger Bush seemed to be promising a continuation of the more modest foreign policy of the first President Bush. The latter had been a realist rather than an idealist. (1) He had not been pleased by the potential fall from power of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev; instead he had feared that Gorbachev's fall might produce the breakup of the Soviet Union, which in turn might present the world in general, and the United States in particular, with new dangers. During the Gulf War, the first president Bush chose not to try and overthrow Saddam Hussein fearing that the potential chaos that might ensue, or the nature of a successor regime, might prove even worse than Saddam Hussein himself.

The links between Bush father and son were also reflected in several of the individuals appointed to major positions in George W. Bush's administration. Richard Cheney, the new vice president, had been the first President Bush's Secretary of Defense. Condoleeza Rice, the new National Security Advisor, was a protégé of Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor to the first President Bush. And, the new

Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had been the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Bush presidency.

At the same time, however, a number of President George W. Bush's appointments in the area of defense and security seemed to lead in another direction. In particular, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, was considered an ideological "hardliner," as was Elliott Abrams, who was named to the National Security Council. Until the September 11 attacks, however, their influence on the Bush administration's foreign policy was not decisive.

U.S. foreign policy after September 11. The terrorist attacks of September 11 immediately transformed the foreign policy of President George W. Bush's administration in several important ways. First, the United States now had an active and aggressive enemy that had launched an unprovoked attack against U.S. civilians on American soil. This gave U.S. foreign policy the focus that had been lacking since the defeat of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Second, the United States was now engaged in a defensive war against an immoral enemy. This increased the influence of the ideological hardliners in the administration, who had been warning the president from the beginning that the international arena was not as benign as it initially had appeared.

The events of September 11 also increased the power of the president in the making of foreign policy. During peacetime, when the United States has no clear enemy, it is very difficult for a U.S. president to take aggressive or innovative steps in the area of foreign policy. Domestic concerns tend to take precedence over foreign policy ones. The ability of the president to ask domestic groups to sacrifice their self-interest for a greater good or a more important goal is limited. Once the United States was attacked, however, President Bush was able to do precisely that. Congress became more cooperative, the executive branch gained relative power over the legislative branch of government, and foreign policy moved to the forefront of the administration's agenda.

Initially the Bush administration's response to the attack focused on destroying Al Qaeda and the government in Afghanistan that harbored the terrorist organization. As more was learned about the structure of Al Qaeda, the war in

Afghanistan expanded to a war against Al Qaeda cells operating in a variety of weak or failed states. Furthermore, the growing intelligence on the links among numerous terrorist organizations worldwide
transformed the war against Al Qaeda into a war against terrorist groups operating in a many countries.

The contrasts between the nature and modus operandi of the new enemy, in comparison to the old Soviet enemy, quickly led to a reevaluation and redefinition of U.S. military strategy and tactics. Cold War strategy had been based on the principles of containment and deterrence. But the terrorists that the U.S. was now confronting were not associated with any particular territory and were not synonymous with a nation state. Containment in the traditional sense, therefore, was irrelevant. The terrorists could also not be deterred from further attacks by the threat of massive retaliation, since their secret and dispersed organization made massive retaliation impossible.

These dilemmas led to the gradual adoption of a new security doctrine, which President Bush hinted at in his January 2002 State of the Union address. In it, he labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea an “axis of evil” and said that they would not be allowed to threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction. (2) Then on June 1, President Bush elaborated further in his speech to the graduates of West Point. In it, the president pointed out how the nature of the enemy had changed:

> “The attacks of September 11 required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than the cost of a single tank.” (3)

He spoke of the “perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology,” which posed “the gravest danger to freedom.” And he explained why deterrence and containment can no longer work against the new kind of enemy:

> “Deterrence- the promise of massive retaliation against nations- means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.” (4)

The president then unveiled what would prove to be the most controversial part of his new U.S. security doctrine- the intention of the United States to undertake unilateral, preemptive military action:

> "…(T)he war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act." (5)

This aspect of the new U.S. security doctrine was elaborated upon several days later by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumseld. At a NATO meeting on June 6, the Secretary asserted that NATO no longer had the luxury of waiting until it had "absolute proof" before taking action against terrorist groups or hostile, threatening countries that possessed biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. NATO's secretary general disagreed, stating that NATO was a defensive alliance. (6) His comment foreshadowed the subsequent debate, both in the United States and abroad, regarding Washington's plans to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Despite his advocacy of preemptive, unilateral U.S. military action, President Bush also spoke of the need to work with "the great powers" and others that share common values. In the president's words, "America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal."(7)

The final part of the new security doctrine elaborated at West Point involves building "modern economies and freer societies." While acknowledging that the United States cannot impose its vision on other countries, the president promised to "support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people." (8)

This "incentive" approach to economic development and political freedom had, in fact, already been announced by the president on March 22 at the U.N. Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico. At that meeting, the president proposed a $10 billion increase in the U.S. development assistance budget over a three-year period. The funds, to be administered through a new Millennium Challenge Account, would be granted to developing countries that showed progress in

good governance, investment in health and education, and sound economic policies. (9) The emphasis on the desire to help create modern economies and freer societies also was congruent with the president's efforts to obtain Trade Promotion Authority from the U.S. Congress in order to negotiate free trade agreements with friendly democratic countries throughout the world.

The West Point speech is not, of course, the final word on U.S. foreign policy and specifically, its new security doctrine. In the early fall, the administration is planning to release a new national security strategy document, that will further elaborate upon the points laid out by President Bush at West Point.

The impact of the new U.S. security doctrine on Latin America. The reformulated U.S. security doctrine has implications for U.S. policy toward Latin America. The changes involve a reordering of Washington's priorities in the Western Hemisphere, as well as changes in the rhetoric and actions of the U.S. government regarding the region in general and specific countries within it.

The most obvious change was the elevation of security concerns to the top of Washington's Latin American agenda. During the Cold War, of course, such concerns had also topped the U.S. agenda toward the region. (10) The preoccupation with security frequently had led Washington to support right-wing military regimes that were friendly to the United States over elected left-wing governments. It also had made clear the very different interests and priorities between Washington and many Latin American leaders. The United States, alarmed by the establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba that had
allied itself with the Soviet Union, as well as the existence and activities of Marxist guerrilla groups in the region supported by Cuba, had increasingly focused on military solutions to what Washington viewed as a military problem. The Latins, in contrast, did
not favor the use of force and instead saw the spread of Communism as a response to poverty, inequality and political repression. Their preferred solution was economic development, and particularly, large amounts of U.S.
aid. As a result of these differences in perceptions and interests, the United States and Latin America often seemed like ships passing in the night during the Cold War years.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Latin America were finally on the same wavelength. Economic development became a priority for both. The first President Bush's call for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 resonated well in the region. Latin American governments began implementing the so-called neo-liberal reforms advocated by the "Washington Consensus" and U.S.-Latin American relations became characterized more by cooperation than by conflict.

Latin Americans understandably fear that U.S.-Latin American relations are heading "back to the future" with Washington's renewed emphasis on security concerns. The global situation today, however, makes such an outcome unlikely. During the Cold War, there were two superpowers, with competing visions of how the world should be organized. Communism, because of its emphasis on the equitable distribution of resources, appealed to Latin American Marxists, who were willing and often eager to turn to the Soviet Union or its allies for economic and military aid. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists and Communism has been discredited. In addition, the Islamic terrorists' ideology and agenda do not appeal to Latin Americans, even to those who intensely resent the United States.

This changed global situation means that the United States should be able to pursue its security goals in Latin America without sacrificing its commitment to democracy and market economies. As a result, Washington may find that it is more able to enlist the cooperation of democratic governments in Latin America in its fight against terrorism. This was often not feasible in the past, either because the Latin American country being threatened by guerrillas was not a democracy or, if it was a democracy, it chose to be neutral or non-aligned in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The impact of the new U. S. policies on Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba.

Washington's renewed emphasis on security in the aftermath of September 11 will not impact all Latin American countries equally. It will most affect four Latin American countries: Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba.

Mexico. Mexico suffered the most immediately following the terrorist attacks. During his campaign, President Bush had said that "the United States is destined to have a special relationship with Mexico, as clear and as strong as we have had with Canada and Great Britain." (11). President Fox had made the first state visit to the new U.S. president, and President Bush's first visit had been to Mexico. Jorge Castaneda, Mexico's new foreign minister, had given extraordinary priority to forging a closer and more cooperative relationship with the Bush administration. In return, he had hoped to achieve an unprecedented immigration agreement that would have allowed the free flow of Mexican labor to the United States and would have regularized the legal status of the millions of undocumented Mexican workers already living in the United States.

September 11 put the "open border" idea on indefinite hold. The new terrorist threat meant that Washington had to tighten its control over its borders in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. Shortly thereafter, however, the Mexican government realized that the terrorist threat provided an opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Washington through cooperation on security issues. The expectation, of course, was that cooperation on security issues would help advance the economic and social priorities of Mexico's bilateral agenda with the United States.

There has already been some progress in this regard. The Bush administration exempted Mexico, together with Canada, its other NAFTA partner, from the new steel tariffs it recently imposed. And at their March meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, Presidents Bush and Fox signed an agreement to increase security along the 2,000 mile shared border between the two countries, while simultaneously agreeing to a number of measures to facilitate the flow of bilateral trade. These include adopting so-called smart identification cards, instituting new high-tech processes for monitoring trade at the border, and commitments to launch a number of infrastructure projects, to be financed jointly, for purposes of decreasing congestion along the border. And although a new immigration agreement regularizing the status of Mexican nationals in the United States is not imminent, talks concerning such a policy have been revived. Mexico's geographic proximity to the United States, its membership in NAFTA, and the existence of a large and growing Mexican-American population in the United States,

all guarantee that the two countries will continue to work together on a full range of bilateral issues.

Colombia. In contrast to Mexico, which initially suffered as a result of Washington's war on terrorism, Colombia has benefited most from the changed security situation. Until September 11, the only way for a U.S. president to get congressional approval for military aid to Colombia was by tying such aid to the war against drugs. In the absence of a global security threat such as the Cold War, Colombia's Marxist guerrillas were considered a domestic problem for Colombia to solve. Even worse, they were often romanticized (outside of Colombia) as popular fighters for social justice, despite the fact that they had the support of less than 2% of the Colombia population, were intent on destroying one of the region's oldest, although imperfect, democracies and engaged in drug production and trafficking, kidnapping of innocent civilians, extortion, robbery and murder.

The events of September 11 allowed the Bush administration to include Colombia's three guerrillas groups, the FARC and the ELN on the left, and the AUC on the right, in its war on terrorism. As a result, the arbitrary line that had existed among U.S. policymakers between military and anti-drug aid could finally be eliminated. Military hardware originally limited to the counter-narcotics campaign could now be used in the war against the guerrillas. Additional funds were approved to help protect the oil pipeline that had repeatedly been blown up by the guerrillas for the purpose of further undermining Colombia's deteriorating economic situation.

The election of Alvaro Uribe on May 26, 2002 as president of Colombia greatly pleased Washington and will facilitate the war against both the guerrillas and the drug traffickers. Like the Bush administration, President Uribe had lost faith in President Pastrana's peace process and regarded the granting of a safe haven to the FARC as a colossal error. Uribe has pledged to increase the size and capabilities of both the armed forces and the police, while creating a network of neighborhood groups to aid in the fight against the guerrillas. Paralleling the new U.S. emphasis on preemptive action against terrorists, he has announced that the army will henceforth work to prevent terrorist attacks, rather than only pursue terrorists after the fact. He has not rejected negotiations, but unlike the Pastrana administration, has demanded

that the guerrillas first lay down their arms. He has also invited the United Nations to become involved in the peace negotiations. And in response to the U.S. government's concern that Colombia make a bigger contribution to the war against its own terrorists, President Uribe has levied a new tax on the wealthiest Colombians to support the war effort.

Within the United States- as well as in Latin America- there are concerns that increased U.S. involvement in Colombia's guerrilla war is a slippery slope that will ultimately lead to U.S. military intervention in the country. Washington is committed to keeping that from happening. Nevertheless, U.S. involvement in Colombia will undoubtedly continue to increase now that Colombia's guerrilla war has become a national security issue for the United States. The fact that Colombia's new president has a strong mandate to bring the nearly 40 year war to a close, and shares Washington's view that successful negotiations will require a credible military threat to the guerrillas, increase the prospects of either a military or a negotiated solution to the conflict.

Venezuela. The other two countries that are most affected by Washington's new foreign policy-Venezuela and Cuba- have governments that are hostile to the United States, unlike the situation in Mexico and Colombia. Even before September 11, President Chávez had defied Washington on a number of issues. He had not allowed U.S. planes engaged in anti-drug activities to fly over Venezuelan territory. President Chávez
was the first head of state since the Gulf War to visit President Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in disregard of the U.N. sanctions. Within OPEC, the Venezuelan government had most resisted Washington's requests to ease pressures on oil prices by increasing oil production. He had also begun to supply Fidel Castro with heavily subsidized Venezuelan oil and allegedly was aiding the FARC in Colombia and other guerrilla groups in Latin America. Finally, the Venezuelan president increasingly was using democratic institutions and processes to subvert Venezuelan democracy and had become a leader of anti-American sentiment within Latin America. (12)

Before September 11, the Bush administration had sought not to provoke the Venezuelan president. As a result, Washington did not make a public issue over the

President's unfriendly behavior or undemocratic actions. After the terrorist attacks, however, the Bush administration's policy began to change. The change coincided with the appointment of Ambassador Otto Reich, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, known for his hard-line views on Cuba, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Washington became more outspoken about President Chávez' undemocratic behavior and his close relations with the leaders of so-called rogue states such as Iraq and Libya. The administration also let it be known that Venezuelan military
support for the FARC would not be tolerated.

After the failed coup attempt against President Chávez in April, 2002, the Bush administration was accused by many of advocating and participating in the effort to overthrow Venezuela's democratically elected president, despite the administration's disavowal of such action. A July report of the U.S. Inspector General showed that "the United States' behavior was in full support of democracy in Venezuela."(13) In fact, Secretary Reich, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Caracas, had repeatedly discouraged the opposition from engaging in undemocratic behavior for the purpose of removing President Chávez. This does not mean that Washington would like the Venezuelan president to remain in power. It only means that the Bush administration would like to see him removed by constitutional means. So far, President Chávez has been very careful not to cross an ill-defined line between what is acceptable and non-acceptable behavior according to Washington. If strong evidence were to surface that Venezuela is arming the Colombian guerrillas or is otherwise engaged in activities that seriously threaten U.S. security interests, there is little doubt that Washington's policy toward the Chavez government would become more actively hostile.

Cuba. Cuba also suffered as a result of the change in U.S. policy following September 11. Until then, momentum had been growing within the United States for ending or at least partially lifting the longstanding U.S. embargo. The anti-embargo coalition had broadened in recent years to include important U.S. businessmen as well as Congressmen representing farm states eager to export to Cuba. U.S. public opinion had also become less supportive of the embargo. And Senator Jesse Helms, one of the

most outspoken and active supporters of the embargo, had announced his decision to retire from the Senate.

On the other hand, President Bush had appointed a number of Cuban Americans, to important foreign policy positions. Most of them favored a continuation of the embargo. The president also owed a debt to the state of Florida, and particularly to the Cuban American community there, which had voted overwhelmingly for him in the disputed Florida presidential election. In addition, the president's brother Jeb was governor of Florida and was seeking reelection in November 2002.

President Bush had supported the continuation of the U.S. embargo during his presidential campaign. Early in this term, he called for stricter enforcement of it, including tighter travel restrictions, more support for opposition groups within Cuba, and a greater effort to stop the Cuban government from jamming Radio and TV Marti broadcasts. At the same time, the president agreed to sell food to Cuba in the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle in November 2001. Such sales were allowed under the modifications to the embargo made during the Clinton administration, provided that no loans were granted to Cuba, either by U.S. public or private entities or by international financial institutions. The decision to sell food to Cuba was a win-win situation for the president. It placated U.S. farmers and exporters of agricultural commodities without making any significant changes in the embargo.

In May of this year, when many observers were expecting the President to further tighten U.S. policy toward Cuba, President Bush announced a "new" Cuba policy that essentially continued the "carrot and stick" approach of existing Cuba policy. The president promised to "ease the ban on travel and trade" if Cuba's elections for the National Assembly, scheduled to be held in 2003, were free and fair, the vote were secret, and the process were monitored by international observers. Another condition was progress toward the implementation of "meaningful market-based reforms. At the same time, new policies for strengthening civil society in Cuba were announced. (14) The Cuban government responded shortly thereafter by enshrining Castro-style socialism in the Cuban constitution.

Before September 11, opponents of the embargo had argued that the Cold War was over and Castro was no longer a threat. Since the terrorist attacks, it has been harder to make the latter argument. There is as yet no evidence that the Castro government is militarily aiding Colombia's left-wing guerrilla groups. Castro, however, has very close relations with the FARC, with the Chávez government, and with so-called rogue states such as Libya, Iran and Iraq. In the aftermath of President Bush's call for free and fair elections, the Cuban president has resumed his harsh rhetoric against the United States and its foreign policy. In such an environment, as long as Castro remains in power, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. embargo will be significantly eased or lifted.

Collaboration and Security in Latin America. The second element of Washington's new approach to security threats, as outlined in President Bush's West Point address, involves cooperation with allies and friendly nations. On September 21, under the leadership of Brazil, the foreign ministers of signatory countries of the 1947 Rio Treaty defined the September 11 attacks as "attacks against all American states." They further declared that "all States Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance…to maintain the peace and security of the continent" and "use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish" anyone suspected of having been involved in the attacks. (15) Only a short time before, the conventional wisdom had been that the Rio Pact was obsolete. The Mexican government, in fact, had begun an effort to have it rescinded and replaced with cooperative agreements to work for the development of the Latin America instead. Given the new terrorist threat and the need for cooperation among the governments of the region in order to deal with it, the Treaty will once again serve as a basis for the collective defense of the hemisphere.

Another institution that will take on more importance in the collaborative efforts to secure the hemisphere from terrorist attack is the Organization of American States (OAS). On June 3, 2002, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. First proposed in 1996, the convention was a primary focus of the United States at this year's meeting of the General Assembly. The text of the convention seems to strengthen limits on the right to political asylum and "may leave

open the possibility of greater international intervention in the event of terrorist concerns." (16)

In the meantime, the fight against terrorism in the hemisphere will require Washington to increase its sharing of intelligence with Latin American governments, particularly the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies. It will also require the upgrading of military and surveillance capabilities in specific countries. According the State Department, more than thirty terrorist groups operate worldwide. And at least ten of them, "including one linked to bin Laden," operate in Latin America. (17) The three guerrilla groups fighting in Colombia are well known. Others are less familiar. Since the late 1980s, the area around Ciudad del Este and Iguazú Falls, strategically located where the borders of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil meet, has attracted suspected terrorists as well as arms and drug dealers. According to the police in Paraguay, "groups linked to the Egyptian Islamic Group (All-Gama'at al-Islamiya-affiliated with Osama bin Laden), the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, and the pro-Palestinian HAMAS organizations operate within a large immigrant community that includes Muslim Arabs and mainland Chinese, many of them believed to be undocumented." (18)

The often close ties between drug and arms traffickers, as well as suspected terrorists, will also require cooperative efforts to change legal systems in order to facilitate the fight against terrorism. Eighteen countries in Latin America have laws that provide for legal sanctions for the laundering of drug profits. Only half of the Latin American countries, however, "have expanded their statutes to apply them to terrorism and international crime." (19), a situation that needs to be changed.

Free Trade and Security in Latin America. The third element of President Bush's West Point speech outlining Washington's new security strategy involves fostering free and open societies throughout the world. It is in this context that President Bush's strong support for a Free Trade Area of the Americas should be viewed. It also explains the great importance that the president placed on obtaining Trade Promotion Authority (formerly known as fast-track authority), as well as an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), during the past year.

The Bush administration has been strongly and widely criticized for several protectionist actions it took recently. These include the president's approval of a farm bill that included large subsidies for large agricultural producers, as well as his signing of a bill granting subsidies to U.S. steel producers. The administration argued that these subsidies were necessary in order to obtain the votes needed to pass Trade Promotion Authority. Whether or not the subsidies were relevant to the final approval of TPA remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that the president was able to obtain congressional approval for TPA despite the fact that President Clinton had tried and failed to do so.

With TPA in hand, the Bush administration can now proceed with negotiations for both a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and a number of bilateral free trade agreements, specifically with Chile and Central America. Such agreements will help reinforce the region's still fragile market reforms, as well as encourage additional reforms. The Bush administration strongly believes that free trade will not only help make Latin America's economies more competitive and facilitate economic growth; it also believes that functioning market economies help strengthen democracy.

Democracy as a Security issue. Support for democracy, like free trade, will continue to constitute an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in general and security policy in particular. This is particularly true with regard to Latin America, an area that shares Western political traditions and values and that is already almost entirely governed by democratically-elected presidents who are either friendly toward, or at least not overtly hostile to, the United States. Admittedly, democracy remains fragile in many Latin American countries and democratic leaders often have not been able to deliver on their promises of economic growth and improved living standards. Nevertheless, there is evidence that despite this, as The Economist recently put it, Latin Americans are

"starting to distinguish between bad governments and the benefits of democracy itself." As a result, "Latin Americans are becoming somewhat more supportive of democracy." (20)

The Bush administration will try and build upon this growing support for democracy by working with Latin American governments and non-governmental

organizations to strengthen the rule of law, political accountability, judicial capabilities and political parties. Its will not use the war against terrorism as an excuse for supporting military coups against democratically elected leaders.

Conclusion The attacks of September 11 once again elevated security concerns to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Fortunately, Latin America is not a locus of anti-American terrorist activities. It is also a region that is almost exclusively governed by democratically elected presidents who want and have good relations with Washington. The new salience of security concerns will therefore not undermine the underpinnings of what was the Bush administration's Latin American policy prior to the terrorist attacks. In fact, unlike the situation during the Cold War, the fight against terrorism is now compatible with U.S. interests in strengthening democracy and market economies and pursing further economic integration and political cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.

FOOTNOTES:

1. For an interesting discussion of the rift between "hardliners" or " ideologues" and "pragmatists" or realists, see Max Boot, "W. for Woodrow," in The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002.
2. Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, "Bush Developing Military Policy of Striking First," The Washington Post, June 10, 2002, p. Al.
3. "Bush's United States Military Academy Graduation Speech, washingtonpost.com, June 2, 2002.
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ricks and Loeb, (Fn. 2.)
7. "Bush's United State Military Academy graduation speech, (Fn. 3.)
8. Ibid
9. Brett D. Schaefer, "The Millennium Challenge Account: An Opportunity to Advance Development in Poor Nations." The Heritage Foundation Heritage Lectures, No. 753, delivered June 27, 2002.
10. For a discussion of the contrast between U. S. policy toward Latin America during and after the Cold War see Susan Kaufman Purcell, " U.S. Policy Toward Latin America After the Cold War," in Douglas W. Payne, Mark Falcoff and Susan Kaufman Purcell, Latin America: U.S. Policy After the Cold War, New York, Americas Society, 1991, pp.47-69.
11. Peter Hakim, "The Uneasy Americas," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2001, p. 58.
12. Ibid., p.56.
13. Sidney Weintraub, "The United States and Latin America: Mutual Disappointments, CSIS Issues in International Political Economy, August 2002, No. 32.
14. "From Bush's Speech: 'The Choice Rests with Mr. Castro," The Wall Street Journal ONLINE, May 20, 2002.

15. “Latin America: Terrorism Convention,” Oxford Analytica Brief, June 14, 2002.
16. Ibid

17. Stephen Johnson, “U.S. Coalition against Terrorism should include Latin America,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1489, October 9, 2001.
18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. “Democracy clings on in a cold economic climate, “ The Economist, August 17, 2002, pp. 29-30.